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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effects of the Federal Reserve’s recent bond buying 
programs, specifically Quantitative Easing 1, Quantitative Easing 2, Operation Twist (or the Fed’s 
Maturity Extension Program), and Quantitative Easing 3. In this study, I provide a picture of the 
economic landscape leading up to the deployment of the programs, an overview of quantitative 
easing including each program’s respective objectives, and how and why the Fed decided to 
implement the programs. Using empirical analysis, I measure each program’s effectiveness by 
applying four models including a yield curve model, an inflation model, a money supply model, and 
an economic activity model. By and large, each stimulus effort added value in varying proportions, 
albeit QE1 negatively influenced the economy in some regards. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2008, economies around the world experienced a financial crisis. Sparked by a housing boom and 
credit terms that allowed many to borrow extensively, as well as a subsequent saturation in home 
ownership and a rise in interest rates (causing several subprime borrowers to default on their loans) 
in the U.S., the crisis spread to consumers and business. Many consider the breaking point to have 
occurred on September 15th, 2008, when Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank, went 
bankrupt. Unlike its dealings with Bear Stearns (the fifth largest investment bank) in which it lent 
support, the United States government decided to let Lehman fail.1 Lehman’s collapse sent ripples 
through the financial markets, freezing credit markets and decreasing confidence in the financial 
system. Figure 1, shows the drop in total consumer credit in early 2008. 
 Throughout the global financial crisis (GFC), market participants questioned the financial 
strength of their counterparties and the future value of assets. Trust, the backbone of the financial 
system, faded and, as a result, liquidity shortfalls arose, not only for banks but also for consumers 
and corporations. Additionally, in 2008, the Federal Reserve was not fulfilling its two primary 
responsibilities: promoting stable prices and maximum employment. As you can see in Figure 2, 
prices dropped and the unemployment rate increased in 2008.3 The preceding economic data and 
the prevalent instability in the financial markets at the time was a major concern of the Fed, setting 
the stage for relief efforts. 
The Federal Reserve deemed action necessary to restore credit market functioning, uphold 
its dual mandate, and attempt to mitigate and/or avoid the tailwinds of the GFC.  From a 
                                                          
1 In March 2008, the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns through its loan, which allowed the central bank to purchase 
$30 billion of Bear Stearns’ out-of-favor mortgage-backed securities, which at the time were essentially 
worthless. 
3 The CPI presented in Figure 2 was sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It includes all items and is 
representative of all urban consumers. 
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conventional standpoint, the Federal Reserve had a few options to achieve its goals; these included 
controlling the discount rate (the interest rate charged to commercial banks and other depository 
institutions for loans received from the Federal Bank’s discount window) and setting reserve 
requirements. For example, when the Fed cuts the discount rate, in theory, banks borrow more, 
causing an increase in the supply of reserves and a decrease in the Federal Funds Rate.4 
Alternatively, by decreasing reserve requirements, the Federal Reserve allows banks to set aside a 
smaller portion of their funds for reserves which therein increases bank lending, the money supply, 
and the money multiplier; thus causing short term rates to fall, all else equal.5 Central banks have 
used these policies previously to bring about desired effects on economies. 
The Federal Reserve chose to reduce its target policy rate-the overnight Federal Funds Rate-
effectively to its minimum, zero, to combat the GFC.  Having not seen noticeable improvement 
from the aforementioned prescription, the Federal Reserve decided to take additional measures.6 
Diverging from conventionalism, the Fed considered taking nontraditional monetary policy actions 
because both the discount rate, pictured in Figure 3, and the target and effective Federal funds rate, 
presented in Figure 4, were already at their lower bounds in 2008. Accordingly, the bond buying 
program, known as Quantitative Easing 1 was borne. 
II. Theory 
Quantitative easing is a form of monetary policy in which the Federal Reserve conducts large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAP) of mainly long-term securities including Treasuries, Agency bonds, and 
                                                          
4 The Federal Funds rate is the interest rate at which banks can lend funds maintained at the Federal Reserve 
to each other overnight 
5 Please refer to Appendix B for a complete history of Federal Reserve’s stated reserve requirements and 
balances maintained by banks. 
6 The economic growth outlook remained sluggish and a threat of significant disinflation were entirely still 
present at that time. 
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Agency Mortgage Backed Securities, in an attempt to drive interest rates downward. The declared 
objective of quantitative easing is to decrease long-term interest rates to stimulate spending and 
investment.7 Specifically, when the Fed makes asset purchases, it artificially boosts demand for the 
respective security and thus drives prices up and yields down. As rates fall, businesses can finance 
new capital investments more cheaply, which results in more investment, increased economic 
activity, new jobs, and ultimately a reduced unemployment rate. Likewise, households can lock in 
lower rates on their mortgage or monthly car payments, thus enticing them to spend more sooner. 
One proclaimed channel through which the LSAP effects take form is the portfolio balance channel. 
The idea of the portfolio balance channel suggests that when the Fed influences the net supply of an 
asset available by conducting LSAP, it alters the portfolio (or quantity and mix) of financial assets 
held by the public.8 That is, the LSAP reduces the yield on the securities targeted and pushes 
investors into holding other assets with similar characteristics. On the downside, there are several 
inherent risks associated with the strategy including a possible decrease in confidence in the dollar,  
inflation, the chance that the Fed will lose money on its purchases (and inevitably either pass on this 
burden to taxpayers or create more money), and the financial market’s reaction to the Fed 
normalizing rates. 
III. Literature Review 
There is significant literature which finds evidence that quantitative easing can influence long-term 
rates. One study by Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack in 2010 concluded that QE1 was broadly 
successful. Their study articulated the program’s effects, including reductions in premium on the 10-
year rate, the longer-term private borrowing rates, Treasury yields, agency debt yields, and agency 
                                                          
7 See Dudley, William C. "The Outlook, Policy Choices and Our Mandate." 
8 See Bernanke, Ben S. "The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy." 
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MBS yields.9 In 2011, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen also made use of an event-study 
method, but they measured both daily and intra-day interest rates and reviewed the Fed’s 
effectiveness in implementing both QE1 and QE2. Importantly, their study documents that MBS 
purchases in QE1 decreased MBS yields and corporate credit risk (and therefore corporate yields). 
Their research also showed that QE2’s Treasury purchases had a substantial impact on Treasury 
yields and agency bonds relative to MBSs and corporate bonds.10 Swanson carried out a high-
frequency event-study approach and presents support from the 1961 Operation Twist. His empirical 
evidence shows a cumulative (from the six announcements he analyzed) decline of 15 basis points 
(bp) on long-term Treasury yields, a 13 bp decline for agency securities, and a 2-4 bp decline for 
corporates.11 There exists much less research analyzing the Fed’s most recent bond buying program, 
QE3, relative to the preceding programs. 
IV. Background 
A. Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1) 
The first round of quantitative easing, QE1, came to the public’s eye on November 25th, 2008 when 
the Federal Reserve, under the guidance of Ben Bernanke, announced it would purchase the direct 
obligations of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, and mortgage back securities (MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Ginnie Mae.13 Buying $100 billion in GSE direct obligations and $500 billion in MBS, the Federal 
Reserve took action in the wake of turbulence in the financial markets. In this way, the Fed had 
                                                          
9 See Gagnon, Joseph, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack, “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the 
Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” 
10 See Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette 2011. “The Effects on Quantitative Easing on 
Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy.” 
11 See Swanson, Eric T. 2011. “Let’s Twist Again: A High-Frequency Event-Study Analysis of Operation 
Twist and Its Implications for QE2.” 
13 See FOMC Press Release Nov 25, 2008 
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hoped to lend some support to the housing market, which at the time was plagued by the effects of 
the subprime mortgage crisis. Accordingly, QE1 was lengthened, with the goals of lowing costs of 
borrowing and assisting in easing credit.  
On three separate occasions, December 16th, 2008, December 30th, 2008, and January 28th 
2009, the Federal Reserve declared that it was willing and able to provide additional stimulus if 
conditions warranted.14 Specifically the Fed communicated that it was prepared to purchase large 
quantities of agency debt, MBS, and long-term Treasuries if the transactions were to be particularly 
effective. On February 23rd, 2009, the FOMC revealed their plan in further detail, providing 
transparency on the level of additional purchases and the make-up of securities likely to be involved 
to all.15 
On March 18th, 2009 the FOMC expanded the LSAP program and announced that between 
January 5, 2009 and March 31, 2010 the Fed would increase its purchases to a total of $1.25 trillion, 
increasing its MBS purchases by up to an additional $750 billion, upping its purchases of agency 
debt to $200 billion (an increase of $100 billion). The Fed decided to purchase up to $300 billion of 
Treasury securities over the succeeding six months to provide additional support to private credit 
markets. Collectively, the preceding purchases became known as “QE1” or the first LSAP.16  
The FOMC reported on August 12th, 2009 that it believed the economy had showed signs of 
development such that it decided to gradually slow the pace of Treasury purchases and designated 
the end of October as the time which the full amount of Treasury purchases would be completed.17 
Similarly, on September 23rd, 2009, the FOMC publicized it would slow the pace of agency debt and 
                                                          
14 See FOMC Statement Dec 16, 2008, FOMC Press Release Dec 30, 2008, and FOMC Press Release Jan 28, 
2009 
15 See FOMC Press Release Feb 23, 2009 
16 See FOMC Statement Mar 18, 2009 
17 See FOMC Statement Aug 12, 2009 
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MBS. The Committee disclosed that by the end of the first quarter of 2010, it will have brought the 
agency debt and MBS purchases to a close.18 Finally, on November 4th, 2009, the FOMC disclosed 
that only $175 billion of agency debt would be purchased, which is less than their previously 
announced maximum of $200 billion, and that purchases would be completed by the end of the first 
quarter of 2010.19 Acting on their intentions, the Fed drew QE1 to a close by the end of March. 
B. Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) 
After having noticed a worrisome disinflationary trend in the U.S. consumer price index, as inflation 
dipped toward 1%, the Fed announced on August 10th, 2010, that it would keep its holdings 
constant by reinvesting its principal payments of about $250 to $300 billion from agency debt and 
agency MBS in long term Treasuries.22 As a result, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet decreased 
because it no longer made additional purchases or re-invested in MBS and agency debt. Soon 
thereafter, the Fed began to signal to the markets that it was considering further asset purchases if 
the economic conditions warranted action. Moreover, the September 21, 2010, FOMC statement 
revealed that the Fed was still troubled by the inflation data with respect to its dual mandate but that 
it would maintain their existing plan to reinvest their principal payments.23  
Following suit, on November 3rd, 2010 the Fed announced that it would purchase an 
additional $600 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds. Together, the reinvestment of principal payments in 
long term Treasuries as well as the additional $600 billion purchase of Treasury bonds became 
known as QE2.  At a pace of about $75 billion per month, the Fed signaled that the program was to 
expire by the end of the second quarter of 2011.24 The Fed followed through and finished the 
                                                          
18 See FOMC Statement Sep 23, 2009 
19 See FOMC Statement Nov 4, 2009 
22 See FOMC Statement Aug 10, 2010 
23 See FOMC Statement Sep 21, 2010 
24 See FOMC Statement Nov 3, 2010 
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program by the end of the second quarter of 2011, as planned. In total, QE2 purchases were 
comprised of securities with maturities primarily between 2.5 and 10 years. 
The rationale behind pursuing QE2 was to aid the United States’ fragile economy. Further, 
the Fed had a fear of replicating Japan’s economic environment throughout the 1990’s and believed 
in the theory that injecting money would create inflation. Consistent with QE1, as short-term rates 
were already near zero, the Fed made an attempt to lower long-term interest rates and increase the 
money supply to bring about inflation. In theory, the lower long-term rates prompt consumers as 
well as businesses to borrow, thus increasing overall consumption as well. Critics of QE2 argued 
that the public’s confidence in the Fed’s ability to exit efficiently from its programs might decrease, 
leading to higher inflation expectations, and Fed had a lack of experience and knowledge about the 
quantitative effects of changes of the its holdings on financial conditions. 
C. Operation Twist (The Fed’s Maturity Extension Program) 
As the VIX, a barometer of both investor sentiment and market volatility, increased to historical 
highs (levels above 40) in the late summer of 2011 and economic growth remained sluggish, many 
were concerned of another recession. The Fed unveiled “Operation Twist” on September 21st, 2011, 
in an attempt to drive down long-term rates.  In Operation Twist, the Fed would purchase an 
additional $400 billion in long-term Treasuries, specifically ones with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 
years, with the proceeds of selling the equivalent in short term treasuries, ones with remaining 
maturities of 3 years or less.  The Fed would do this over a nine-month timeframe, with an 
expiration of the program by June 2012.25 In other words, the Fed decided to shift the makeup of its 
balance sheet by trading short-term treasuries for long bonds. Moreover, the nature of the program 
constrained the Fed by the amount of short-term securities it held. On June 20th, 2012, near the end 
                                                          
25 See FOMC Statement Sep 21, 2011 
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date of Operation Twist, the Fed decided to extend the program by an additional $267 billion.26 In 
contrast to QE2, throughout this particular open market operation the Fed didn’t expand the 
monetary base but simply influenced the term structure of interest rates by altering the makeup of its 
holdings. Additionally the Fed commented in its announcement on June 20th, 2012, that it would be 
rolling over maturing agency debt and MBS, and thus not replacing them with Treasury securities.  
D. Quantitative Easing 3 (QE3) 
On September 13th, 2012 the Fed expressed its concern that without continued policy 
accommodation it wouldn’t have the capacity to achieve its 2% inflation target and there wouldn’t 
exist sustained improvement in the labor market. For this reason, the Fed announced that it would 
purchase $40 billion of agency MBS per month, but no longer with financing from the sale of short 
term treasuries.27 As time passed and the Fed’s Maturity Extension Program (i.e., Operation Twist) 
expired, the Fed pledged on December 12th, 2012, to increase its involvement by purchasing an 
additional $45 billion of long term Treasury securities per month, therein bringing the total of 
monthly purchases to $85 billion per month. This program is generally referred to as QE3.28 
Nevertheless, the Fed didn’t announce an end date to this policy (unlike prior operations), but rather 
stated it would monitor economic data and accommodate accordingly. 
The total monthly purchases of $85 billion continued to take place until the Federal Reserve 
announced on December 18th, 2013 that beginning in January it would reduce (taper) its monthly 
purchases to a total of $75 billion.29 It announced that the purchases would consist of $40 billion of 
Treasuries and $35 billion of agency MBS. Through time, the Fed continued to monitor the relevant 
economic data concerning their stimulus packages. If the data justified another taper, the Fed would 
                                                          
26 See FOMC Statement Jun 20, 2012 
27 See FOMC Statement Sep 13, 2012 
28 See FOMC Statement Dec 12, 2012 
29 See FOMC Statement Dec 18, 2013 
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follow by voting to continue taper. I summarize the Federal Reserve’s tapering decisions in Table 
1.31 
 Beyond tapering and the end of QE3 the Federal Reserve continued to mention to 
households and corporations alike that rate hikes wouldn’t take place for a “considerable amount of 
time”.32 At some point in time, however, the Fed will begin to normalize interest rates in order to re-
stabilize markets. The question of when, remains to be answered but will largely rely on a host of 
key economic indicators monitored by the Fed. 
E. Summary 
I summarize the Federal Reserve’s Bond Buying Programs in Table 2. 
V. Analysis 
A. Data 
I present the data used to conduct analysis in Table 3. The time-series data spans the period 
beginning October 2006 and ending October 2014.33 I use data that includes a pre-crisis period as a 
base for comparison. I capture the effects from all of the Fed’s bond buying programs and 
additionally expand on some of the prior research by measuring the effects of each of the programs 
on Treasury yields, the TED Spread, the slope of the yield curve, the money supply, inflation, 
lending, stress levels, and consumption.  
                                                          
31 Each taper reduced the Fed’s monthly purchases by $5 billion in Treasuries and $5 billion in Agency MBS, 
except for the final taper. The final taper reduced the Fed’s monthly purchases by $10 billion in Treasuries 
and $5 billion in Agency MBS, ending QE3. See FOMC Statement Jan 29 2014, FOMC Statement Mar 19, 
2014, FOMC Statement Apr 30, 2014, FOMC Statement Jun 18, 2014, FOMC Statement Jul 30, 2014, and 
FOMC Statement Sep 17, 2014 
32 See FOMC Statement Oct 29, 2014 
33 All of the data was analyzed on a monthly basis. 
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0 if the observation didn’t occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 * Xk 
1 if the observation occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 * Xk 
 
Where Xk = the month over month percentage change in the Federal Reserve’s 
cumulative total holdings of Federal Agency Securities, Mortgage Backed Securities, and 
long term Treasury Purchases for time period (Xk). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0 if the observation didn’t occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 
1 if the observation occurred within Quantitative Easing 1  
 
 
 
  
B. Methodology 
The purpose of the analysis is to examine the effect of the Fed’s programs on credit availability, the 
term structure of interest, inflation, the money supply, and economic activity. Accordingly, I 
designed four separate models including a yield curve model, an inflation model, a money supply 
model, and an economic activity model. I use regression analysis on each of the four models to 
capture the implications of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. 
1. Yield Curve Model 
I analyzed Treasury yields, the slope of the yield curve, and the TED spread by using the following 
regression equation that contains four dummy variables (one for each of the Federal Reserve’s bond 
buying programs), QE1, QE2, TWIST, and QE3 and four slope-dummy variables (to account for 
the size of each of the programs), SIZEQE1, SIZEQE2, SIZETWIST, and SIZEQE3. 
Y = β0 + β1QE1 + β2QE2 + β3TWIST + β4QE3 + β5SIZEQE1 + β6SIZEQE2 + β7SIZETWIST 
+ β8SIZEQE3 + ε 
QE1 = { 
 
The dummy variable, QE1, is such that the variable takes on a value of 1 if the observation 
occurred during the timeframe of Quantitative Easing 1, 0 otherwise. In the same fashion, I built 
dummy variables for QE2, TWIST, and QE3.    
 
SIZEQE1 = { 
 
 
The slope dummy variables were designed by starting with the same premises as the dummy 
variables above such that a 0 was added into the data range if the observation didn’t occur during 
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the timeframe of Quantitative Easing 1; if in fact the observation did occur during the timeframe of 
Quantitative Easing 1, a 1 was added to the data range. I then multiplied the determined value of 
each month (0 or 1) in the dataset by its respective month over month percentage change in the 
Federal Reserve’s cumulative total holdings of Federal Agency Securities, Mortgage Backed 
Securities, and long term Treasury Purchases for the time period (Xk
34). I continued in the same 
regard to generate the remaining slope dummies (SIZEQE2, SIZETWIST, and SIZEQE3). Table 4 defines 
the respective starting and ending dates for each of the Federal Reserve’s successive bond buying 
programs. 
The sample consisted of 97 observations on each run. I ran regressions using SAS software 
to measure the extent to which the Federal Reserve influenced each of the dependent variables: 
Treasury yields, the slope of the yield curve, and the TED spread (each are represented by Y in the 
regression equation).  
2. Inflation, Money Supply, and Economic Activity Models 
I analyzed inflation proxies, the money supply, and six economic activity indicators by using the 
following regression equation that contains four dummy variables (one for each of the Federal 
Reserve’s bond buying programs), QE1, QE2, TWIST, and QE3, four slope-dummy variables (to 
account for the size of each of the programs), SIZEQE1, SIZEQE2, SIZETWIST, and SIZEQE3, and three 
additional independent variables, UNEMP, IP, and CS, to control for business cycles. 
Y = β0 + β1QE1 + β2QE2 + β3TWIST + β4QE3 + β5SIZEQE1 + β6SIZEQE2 + β7SIZETWIST 
+ β8SIZEQE3 + β9UNEMP + β10IP + β11CS + ε 
 
QE1 = {  
 
                                                          
34 X1 refers to time period 1 which I define as the month of October 2006. Each successive month is denoted 
in the same manner such that November 2006 is X2 and so forth. 
0 if the observation didn’t occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 
1 if the observation occurred within Quantitative Easing 1  
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0 if the observation didn’t occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 * Xk 
1 if the observation occurred within Quantitative Easing 1 * Xk 
 
Where Xk = the month over month percentage change in the Federal Reserve’s 
cumulative total holdings of Federal Agency Securities, Mortgage Backed Securities, and 
long term Treasury Purchases for time period (Xk). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The dummy variable, QE1, is such that the variable takes on a value of 1 if the observation 
occurred during the timeframe of Quantitative Easing 1, 0 otherwise. In the same fashion, I built 
dummy variables for QE2, TWIST, and QE3.    
SIZEQE1 = {  
 
 
 
The slope dummy variables were designed by starting with the same premises as the dummy 
variables above such that a 0 was added into the data range if the observation didn’t occur during 
the timeframe of Quantitative Easing 1; if in fact the observation did occur during the timeframe of 
Quantitative Easing 1, a 1 was added to the data range. I then multiplied the determined value of 
each month (0 or 1) in the dataset by its respective month over month percentage change in the 
Federal Reserve’s cumulative total holdings of Federal Agency Securities, Mortgage Backed 
Securities, and long term Treasury Purchases for the time period (Xk). I continued in the same regard 
to generate the remaining slope dummies (SIZEQE2, SIZETWIST, and SIZEQE3).  
I used the unemployment rate as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (UNEMP), the 
levels of the Industrial Production Index (IP), and the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment 
Index (CS) to capture business cycles. I chose each variable carefully to fully control for business 
cycles.  
The sample consisted of 97 observations on each run for each of the three models. I ran 
regressions using SAS software to measure the extent to which the Federal Reserve affected each of 
the dependent variables (each are represented by Y in the regression equation). I tested 3 inflation 
proxies in my inflation model: 
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1. the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s Median Consumer Price Index (MCPI),  
2. the Producer Price Index (All Commodities), and  
3. breakeven inflation (the difference between the yield on a 5 Year Treasury Inflation 
Protected Security and the yield on the 5 Year Treasury Note).  
To understand further implications of the programs effect on inflation, I also analyzed the 
Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index in my inflation model.35 In my money supply model, I examined 
the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base and the M2 Money Stock. Finally, in my economic activity 
model I investigated six different economic indicators: 
1. the monthly return on the S&P 500 Index,  
2. the amount of commercial paper outstanding,  
3. the Cleveland Financial Stress Index, 
4. the personal savings rate, 
5. the level of personal consumption expenditures, and 
6. the amount of consumer loans at all commercial banks. 
VI. Results 
Collectively, the stimulus measures put into place were predominantly successful. The Fed was 
broadly successful in reducing yields on the front-end of the yield curve with all four programs. 
Nevertheless, only the latter programs, Operation Twist and QE3, seem to have influenced the long-
end of the yield curve. QE1, QE2, and QE3 affected the yield curve such that it became more 
upward sloping, suggesting strong future growth in the economy. On a similar note, I demonstrated 
that QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3 significantly reduced the TED spread, bolstering trust in the 
                                                          
35 The Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index includes all major currencies (Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden). 
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banking system. Moreover, QE1 and QE3 increased the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base in a 
statistically significant manner, lending to amplified spending and investment. Likewise, QE1, 
Operation Twist, and QE3, significantly increased the M2 Money Stock.  
In terms of inflation, QE1 likely had a negative impact on major inflation indexes including 
the PPI, MCPI, and breakeven inflation. Albeit these results, it’s tenable to believe that QE1 actually 
dampened a disinflationary trend. Contrarily, QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3 increased the overall 
price level, according to the PPI. Seemingly, QE2 and Operation Twist also significantly reduced the 
value of the dollar. From the perspective of large corporations seeking capital in the short-term, 
none of the programs look to have had an effect on the amount of commercial paper outstanding. 
Further, QE1 had a negative statistically significant impact on the total amount of consumer loans at 
all commercial banks, though QE3 had the opposite effect. 
There is no evidence which suggests that the bond buying programs had any ramification on 
the monthly returns of the S&P 500 Index. The amount of personal consumption expenditures were 
favorably affected by QE1 and QE3, proliferating spending and investment. By contrast, Operation 
Twist appears to have had a positive impact on the personal savings rate. Finally, analogous with 
intuition, Operation Twist raised the market’s stress level, whereas QE3 settled the overall market’s 
nerves. Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 summarize the results of the multiple regression analysis for each of the 
models.  
A. The Yield Curve Model 
My regression analysis indicts some success of the Fed in achieving its stated objective as it relates to 
their intended impacts on yields and the yield curve. As I depict in Table 5, QE1, QE2, Operation 
Twist, and QE3 all had a statistically significant impact in reducing the yield on the 2 Year Treasury 
Note. Similarly, QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3 had a statistically significant effect in decreasing 
 20 
the yield on the 5 Year Treasury Note. Interestingly, only Operation Twist and QE3 had a 
statistically significant ramification in compressing the yields on the 10 and 30 Year Treasury Bonds. 
This conclusion suggests that almost every stimulus effort largely affected the front-end of the yield 
curve. By contrast, the long-end of the yield curve was only affected by the latter programs, 
Operation Twist and QE3. I also tested the equality of the slopes across maturities using SAS 
software. My analysis evidenced that the effect of each program was significant across all maturities: 
Variable F Value Pr > F 
US2 20.85 0.0001 
US5 11.52 0.0001 
US10 15.98 0.0001 
US30 15.45 0.0001 
 
In sum, it is probable that the Federal Reserve was indeed effective in decreasing the interest rates of 
Treasuries, making lending more affordable to consumers and thereby promoting spending and 
investment. 
The TED Spread (i.e. the difference between the yield on the 3-Month T-bill and the 3-
Month LIBOR) is an indicator of interbank credit risk and the perceived health of the banking 
system. When the spread narrows, interbank default risk is considered to be lower and the health of 
the banking system is greater. Conversely, the higher the perceived risk of default on interbank loans 
or counterparty risk, the wider the spread.  The regression results in Table 5, indicate that the Fed 
strengthened the health of the banking system by having a statistically significant impact with three 
of its programs: QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3. It is unclear why QE1 didn’t have a statistically 
significant impact on the TED spread, given its size relative to other programs. However, it stands 
within reason that there was a time lag associated with the implication of QE1. Nevertheless, the 
Fed had mostly success in decreasing the TED spread, stimulating a healthier banking system. 
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Additionally, I tested each of the bond buying programs’ implications on the slope of the 
yield curve. The yield curve captures the general trend of interest rates as well as the relationships 
between short-term and long-term rates. Under normal circumstances, short-term securities will 
have lower yields than long-term securities. The yield curve is highly monitored by economists and 
investors alike as it has been quite indicative of future economic activity.36 An inverted yield curve 
exists when short-term securities carry a higher yield than long-term securities; i.e.-the yield curve is 
downward sloping. As is depicted in Figure 5, shortly after the GFC, the yield curve sloped relatively 
flattish, signaling an economic slowdown.  
Noticeably, in Figure 6, the Federal Reserve’s announcement of QE1 changed the slope of 
the yield curve. As  portrayed in looking at both Figure 5 and Figure 6, the slope of the yield curve 
became more upward sloping in post-GFC times. The more modern, positive slope of the yield 
curve is a sign of more positive future economic activity and thereby a more productive Federal 
Reserve. 
This view is further supported by reviewing the results of the variable “SLOPE” from my 
regression. As is seen in Table 3, I define the SLOPE variable as the spread between the yield on the 
10-year Treasury bond and the yield on the 2-year Treasury note. As is displayed in Table 5, QE1, 
QE2, and QE3 were statistically significant in driving the slope of the yield curve higher, suggesting 
that the Federal Reserve may have spurred economic growth going forward. Recall that Operation 
Twist involved the Fed exchanging some of their short term securities for longer-term securities but 
didn’t necessitate the Fed increasing the size of its balance sheet, thus it is justifiable that the 
program didn’t have a significant impact on the SLOPE variable.37 
                                                          
36 See Haubrich, Joseph G. "Does the Yield Curve Signal Recession?" 
37 To ensure the validity of my results, I also ran my yield curve model using an additional dummy variable, 
NBER, to control for business cycles. NBER denotes the National Bureau of Economic Research. The 
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B. The Inflation Model 
I use three indicators of inflation in my analysis: 
1. the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s Median Consumer Price Index (MCPI),  
2. the Producer Price Index (All Commodities), and  
3. breakeven inflation.  
I chose to use the MCPI, rather than the BLS’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) because the index 
negates the impact volatile items (such as food and energy) have on overall prices. As a result, the 
index provides a better signal of the inflation trend than the BLS’ All-Items CPI or CPI excluding 
food and energy. The MCPI is measured from the prospective of consumers. To more broadly 
capture inflation, I also scrutinized the Fed’s effect on the PPI as it is an index which is built from 
the vantage point of businesses and corporations. Finally, I created a market-based quantifier of 
inflation by using the difference between the yield on a 5 Year Treasury Inflation Protected Security 
(TIPS) and the yield on the 5 Year Treasury note to calculate breakeven inflation. 
At first glance, as exhibited in Table 6, it seems that the bond buying programs had no 
statistically significant impact on the PPI. However, I wasn’t able to discern whether these results 
were entirely accurate as a problem due to multicollinearity likely existed.38 To have a better handle 
on how the additional control variables affected my model, I also ran the model without any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dummy variable, NBER, was created such that the variable took on a value of 1 if the observation took place 
during an NBER-characterized recessionary month, 0 otherwise. The NBER concluded that a recession 
occurred from December 2007 to May 2009. As the NBER’s methodology is backward-looking and only 
characterizes business cycles through June 2009, I assumed that beyond June 2009 no other U.S. business 
cycle contractions materialized. The regression analysis results pertaining to this model can be found in 
Appendix D. Note that the results related to this model are distorted due to multicollinearity. Though the 
results were very similar, adding NBER as an independent variable likely robbed some explanatory power 
away from other independent variables, especially with regard to each bond buying programs’ effect on the 
TED spread. A correlation matrix, specific to this model, is presented in Appendix C. 
38 Appendix E displays a correlation matrix containing all of the variables used in the model. Noticeably, 
many of the independent variables are highly correlated with each other in a statistically significant manner, 
likely bringing about the effects of multicollinearity. 
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variables controlling for business cycles (UNEMP, IP, and CS). The results, displayed in Appendix 
F, suggest that every program had an effect on the PPI and affirm that the added independent 
variables reduced explanatory power from each of the bond buying programs. Even so, only QE2, 
Operation Twist, and QE3 had an effect in line with the Fed’s objectives on the index. That is, only 
QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3 had a positive, statistically significant impact on the PPI and thus 
brought rise to an upward trend in the price level. By contrast, QE1 negatively influenced inflation 
according to my model which didn’t control for business cycles. Nevertheless, as is pictured in 
Figure 7, it is possible that QE1 may have actually dampened a disinflationary trend which was 
prevalent at the time, contrary to my regression analysis results.  
As exhibited in Table 6, the MCPI was only statistically significantly influenced by QE1. 
However, QE1 had a negative effect on inflation according to the output. Similar to the theory 
behind the PPI results, it is probable that QE1 lessened a worrisome trend. When I ran the inflation 
model without controlling for business cycles, QE1 had a negative statistically significant effect on 
breakeven inflation. As this result aligns with the other inflation proxies, QE1 did indeed have a 
negative effect on inflation, though it is feasible that the program actually took the edge off of a 
concerning trend.39 
Consistent with the PPI output, the value of the dollar decreased as QE2 and Operation 
Twist began. That is, QE2 and Operation Twist (two programs which had a positive effect on 
inflation) had a negative impact on the value of the dollar. Despite the statistically significant size of 
QE1, the program does not appear to have had any effect on the value of the dollar. Plausibly, the 
Federal Reserve mostly accomplished their goals to combat disinflation and promote stable prices. 
                                                          
39 As was the case with PPI, the breakeven inflation results were also disturbed by multicollinearity. 
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C. The Money Supply Model 
The money supply can have a powerful effect on economic activity. Theoretically, an increase in the 
money supply lowers interest rates, which naturally incentivizes individuals to hold more money as 
the opportunity cost decreases, and promotes spending and investment. In response, businesses 
order more raw materials and ramp-up production; in turn, the greater production creates a need for 
more labor. That said, an increase in the money supply may lead to greater spending and investment 
and a lower unemployment rate, thus stimulating the economy. Finally, if the money supply 
continues to grow at a faster pace than output, prices may begin to rise.40  
I measured the effects of each of the Federal Reserve’s programs on the St. Louis Adjusted 
Monetary Base and the M2 Money Stock. The St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base is the sum of 
currency (including coin) in circulation outside Federal Reserve Banks and the U.S. Treasury, plus 
deposits held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, adjusted for the effects of changes 
in statutory reserve requirements and the quantity of base money held by depositories. Interestingly, 
as laid out in Table 7, only QE1 and QE3 had a statistically significant impact on the St. Louis 
Adjusted Monetary Base.41 The programs increased the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base. 
Reiterating, an increase in the money supply tends to spur spending and investment while decreasing 
interest rates, easing credit conditions, a major objective of the Fed’s policies.  
The M2 Money Stock includes a broader set of financial assets held chiefly by households 
because it includes assets which are highly liquid but not cash (though they could be easily 
converted). It consists of the M1 plus: savings deposits (which include money market deposit 
accounts), small denomination time deposits, and balances in retail money market mutual funds. The 
                                                          
40 See Schwartz, Anna J. "Money Supply." 
41 QE2 also had a positive, statistically significant impact on the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base when I 
tested the model without controlling for business cycles. Multicollinearity likely persisted and reduced some 
of QE2’s explanatory power. The related regression results and correlation matrix are observable in 
Appendices H and G, respectively. 
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M2 is a more inclusive money supply quantifier which many consider more precise. My regression 
results, pictured in Table 7, indicate that QE1, Operation Twist, and QE3 all had a positive, 
statistically significant impact on the M2. As Operation Twist didn’t necessitate an increase in the 
Federal Reserve’s holdings, it jives with intuition that the program increased the M2 Money Stock, 
but not necessarily the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base. As mentioned, an increase in the money 
supply lends to increased spending and investment. 
In sum, my results indicate that the Fed was successful in pursuing some of its desired 
objectives. The St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base and the M2 Money Stock were both affected 
positively. As planned, the Fed promoted spending and investment and therein a stronger economy.  
D. The Economic Activity Model 
In this model I examine six different economic indicators including: 
1. the monthly return on the S&P 500 Index,  
2. the amount of commercial paper outstanding,  
3. the Cleveland Financial Stress Index, 
4. the personal savings rate, 
5. the level of personal consumption expenditures, and 
6. the total amount of consumer loans at all commercial banks. 
My results, illustrated in Table 8, imply that none of the programs had any effect on the commercial 
paper market or the monthly return on the S&P 500 Index, despite the statistically significant results 
related to the yield curve. In theory, it would follow that the bond buying programs would push 
investors away from safer assets like Treasuries (as the yields significantly decreased) but towards 
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riskier assets such as stocks, thus increasing equity prices. However, there is no evidence which 
suggests that this phenomenon took place as a result of the Federal Reserve’s stimulus efforts.42 
From the perspective of consumers, in contrast with the Fed’s stated objectives, the results 
of my analysis indicate that QE1 had a negative, statistically significant impact on the total amount 
of consumer loans at all commercial banks. Although, QE3 proved beneficial, increasing the total 
amount of consumer loans at all commercial banks in a statistically significant way. In this case, the 
results were mixed in terms of the Federal Reserve reaching its over-arching goals-to ease credit 
conditions and provide more liquidity to credit markets.43 
I also used the Federal Reserve Bank Cleveland’s CFSI to observe if the Federal Reserve’s 
Programs had any impact on the overall market’s stress levels. Much to the Federal Reserve’s 
dismay, as shown in Table 8, Operation Twist had a statistically significant impact on the CFSI such 
that it elevated the overall market’s level of stress. Throughout Operation Twist the overall market 
experienced moderate to significant stress levels according to the CFSI. Table 9 describes the CFSI’s 
stress thresholds. Fortunately, QE3 had a statistically significant impact on the CFSI such that it 
deflated stress levels. No other programs had a statistically significant impact on the CFSI. 
In line with the results of the CFSI, Operation Twist had a positive, statistically significant 
effect on the personal savings rate. Rationally, the program caused consumers to increase their 
savings at a time when stress levels were higher than normal. To the Fed’s credit, the amount of 
personal consumption expenditures were positively, statistically significantly affected by QE1 and 
QE3. This indicates that the Federal Reserve not only promoted spending and investment but also 
                                                          
42 One possible explanation my model did not discover this result is that the monthly returns I used were not 
total returns and thus did not factor in dividends. 
43 The economic activity model was also effected by multicollinearity in some cases. Refer to Appendices I 
and J, respectively, to see the model’s correlation matrix and regression results without controlling for 
business cycles. 
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that it significantly enticed consumers to spend. Altogether, it appears the Federal Reserve sparked 
economic growth, fueling the economy going forward. 
VII. Conclusion and Implications 
As central banking operations have adapted over time such that formerly unconventional monetary 
policies like QE have become common, it is highly important to consider all of the effects of the 
programs, especially as most of the central banks have little experience in implementing such 
strategies. I have examined many effects of the Federal Reserve’s bond buying programs by testing 
the effects of these programs on key financial indicators. 
By pursuing LSAP, it appears the Federal Reserve has realized its goal to lower long-term 
yields, though not necessarily with each bond buying program. Overall, the Fed was broadly 
successful in reducing yields on the front-end of the yield curve with all four programs. However, 
only Operation Twist and QE3 seem to have influenced the long-end of the yield curve. 
Furthermore, there is significant evidence which suggests that QE1, QE2, and QE3 affected the 
yield curve such that it became more upward sloping, signaling economic growth in the future. On a 
similar note, I evidenced that QE2, Operation Twist, and QE3 significantly reduced the TED 
spread, a testament to the Federal Reserve increasing the health of the banking system. 
It turns out that QE1 and QE3 increased the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base in a 
statistically significant manner. Building on these results, QE1, Operation Twist, and QE3, 
significantly increased the M2 Money Stock. From the vantage point of the PPI, all of the programs 
had a statistically significant effect on inflation, though not all of the effects were positive. Opposite 
of the Fed’s intentions, QE1 likely had a negative impact on major inflation indexes including the 
PPI, MCPI, and breakeven inflation. Although, it’s conceivable that QE1 actually traversed a 
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disinflationary trend which had prevailed at the time. In line with the PPI output, the value of the 
dollar decreased as result of QE2 and Operation Twist.  
In terms of lending, none of the programs look to have had an effect on the amount of 
commercial paper outstanding. My output suggests that QE1 had a negative statistically significant 
repercussion on the total amount of consumer loans at all commercial banks. Nevertheless, QE3 
reversed this trend, increasing the total amount of consumer loans at all commercial banks in a 
statistically significant fashion. 
Despite the overall decrease in yields on riskless assets (such as Treasuries), there is no 
testimony which supports that the bond buying programs provoked a significant change in the 
monthly returns of the S&P 500 Index. QE1 and QE3 seem to have promoted spending and 
investment as the programs had a positive statistically significant effect on the amount of personal 
consumption expenditures. Conversely, to a degree, Operation Twist appears to have had a positive 
impact on the personal savings rate. Finally, in line with the preceding results, Operation Twist 
unquestionably raised the overall market’s stress level, whereas QE3 settled the overall market’s 
nerves. 
It is clear from this study that the bond buying programs had a large impact on the 
economy. As many of the world’s advanced economies are intertwined and connected, the Fed 
should consider not only the first order but also the second order consequences of their actions. It 
seems that each individual bond buying program brought about significant effects on various 
economic indicators but that in essence, the entire line of stimulus was widely successful. Future 
studies should examine the reasoning behind the differences in value added. Finally, although it 
seems that the Federal Reserve was largely successful with its LSAPs in realizing their goals, it is 
difficult to tell whether or not the measures the Fed took were indeed optimal. Regardless, serious 
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thought and deliberation on the Federal Reserve’s actions will only serve to better equip central 
banks in the future. 
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IX. Tables and Figures 
A. Tables 
Table 1:  The Fed’s Tapering Decisions 
 
Announcement Date 
 
Taper 
Amount 
 
Prior Total of 
Monthly 
Purchases 
 
New Total of 
Monthly 
Purchases 
 
Month in 
which Policy 
Action Took 
Effect 
December 18th, 2013 $10 billion $85 billion $75 billion January 2014 
January 29th, 2014 $10 billion $75 billion $65 billion February 201 
March 19th, 2014 $10 billion $65 billion $55 billion April 2014 
April 30th, 2014 $10 billion $55 billion $45 billion May 2014 
June 18th, 2014 $10 billion $45 billion $35 billion July 2014 
July 30th, 2014 $10 billion $35 billion $25 billion August 2014 
September 17th, 2014 $10 billion $25 billion $15 billion October 2014 
October 29th, 2014 $15 billion $15 billion $0 billion November 2014 
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Table 2:  Summary of The Federal Reserve’s Bond Buying Programs 
Program Beginning Date Ending Date Composition 
 
QE1 
 
November 25th, 2008 
 
March 31st, 2010 
$1.25 billion of MBS, $175 billion 
of agency debt, and $300 billion of 
Treasury securities 
 
QE2 
 
November 30th, 2010 
 
June 30th, 2011 
$250 to $300 billion reinvestment 
of agency debt and agency MBS 
principal payment; $600 billion in 
Treasuries 
 
Operation 
Twist 
 
September 21st, 2011 
 
December 31st, 2012 
$667 billion swap of short-term 
Treasuries for long-term 
Treasuries 
 
 
QE3 
 
 
September 13th, 2012 
 
 
October 29th 201444 
$40 billion of agency MBS per 
month for September, November, 
and December 2012; $45 billion of 
Treasuries and $40 billion of 
agency MBS per month for 
January 2013 – December 2013; 
See Table 1 (tapering timeline) 
 
                                                          
44 Though the final taper didn’t take effect until November 2014, I defined the end of QE3 as the end of 
October 2014 because of data limitations. 
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Table 3:  Data Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Type Data Description Source 
US2 D45 The yield on the 2 Year Treasury Note Treasury yields can be expressed as the interest rate which the U.S. Government pays to 
borrow money for different lengths of time. Conversely, from the investors’ perspective, 
treasury yields are simply the return on investment on the U.S. government’s debt 
obligations. 
USDT46 
US5 D The yield on the 5 Year Treasury Note USDT 
US10 D The yield on the 10 Year Treasury Bond USDT 
US30 D The yield on the 30 Year Treasury Bond USDT 
TIPS5 D The yield on the 5 Year Treasury Inflation Protected 
Security (TIPS) 
The yield on a 5 Year Treasury Note plus some inflation premium. FRED47 
SLOPE D The difference between the yield on the 10 Year 
Treasury Bond and yield on the 2 Year Treasury 
Note 
Measures the slope of the yield curve by observing the difference in the yield on the 10 
Year Treasury Bond and the yield on the 2 Year Treasury Note, which I designed. 
USDT 
TED D The TED Spread (the difference between the yield 
on the 3-Month Treasury Bill (T-bill) and the 3-
Month London Interbank Offered Rate or LIBOR (a 
benchmark rate that some of the world’s leading 
banks charge each other for short-term loans) 
As the U.S. Government’s T-bills are essentially risk free, the TED spread can be viewed 
as a risk premium which banks charge each other, given their slightly higher probability of 
default. All else equal, the higher the perceived risk of default on interbank loans or 
counterparty risk, the higher the spread. Conversely, as the spread decreases the interbank 
default risk is considered to be lower. Thus, the TED Spread is a great indicator of 
interbank credit risk and the perceived health of the banking system. 
FRED 
INFL D The difference between the yield on a 5 Year 
Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) and the 
yield on the 5 Year Treasury Note 
Also known as breakeven inflation, it considered a market-based quantifier of inflation. USDT,          
FRED 
PPI D The Producer Price Index: All Commodities The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures the average change over time in selling prices 
received by domestic producers for their output. 
FRED 
 
                                                          
45 D denotes that the data item is a dependent variable in its respective model. 
46 USDT denotes the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
47 FRED denotes the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database 
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Table 3:  Data Variables Continued 
Variable 
Name 
Type Data Description Source 
MCPI D The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s Median 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Median CPI is calculated by using the prices of a basket of goods and services published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and finding the median price change (or the price change 
that’s right in the middle of the long list of all of the price changes). This calculation process 
negates the impact volatile items (such as food and energy) have on the overall basket of goods 
and services. 
FRED 
MB D The St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base The sum of currency (including coin) in circulation outside Federal Reserve Banks and the U.S. 
Treasury, plus deposits held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks. These data are 
adjusted for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base 
money held by depositories. 
FRED 
M2 D The M2 Money Stock The M2 includes a broader set of financial assets held chiefly by households because it includes 
assets which are highly liquid but not cash (though they could be easily converted). M2 consists 
of M1 plus: savings deposits (which include money market deposit accounts), small 
denomination time deposits, and balances in retail money market mutual funds. 
FRED 
SP50048 D The return on the S&P 500 Index The S&P 500 is seen as a gauge of the large cap U.S. equities market. The index includes 500 
leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy, which are publicly held on either 
the NYSE or NASDAQ, and covers 75% of U.S. equities. The index is a price index rather 
than a total return index.  
S&P 
DJI49 
CP D The total amount of commercial paper outstanding Commercial paper consists of promissory notes issued primarily by corporations. Often, large 
corporations use Commercial Paper to raise cash needed for current transactions as it is 
considered a lower-cost alternative to bank loans. 
FRED 
CFSI D The Cleveland Financial Stress Index50 The Cleveland Financial Stress Index is designed to track stress in the U.S. financial system on 
a continuous basis. The index incorporates information from a number of different financial 
markets to provide a measure of financial system stress. 
FRBC51 
 
                                                          
48 The S&P 500 Index data does not include dividends. Dividend return may make up a significant portion of an index’s total return. 
49 S&P DJI denotes S&P Dow Jones Indicies 
50 The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reports the Cleveland Financial Stress Index on a daily basis. I converted the daily data to monthly data by 
calculating the simple average of the daily index reading for each month. 
51 FRBC denotes the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
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Table 3:  Data Variables Continued 
Variable 
Name 
Type Data Description Source 
PS D The personal saving rate The ratio of personal saving to disposable personal income as reported by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
PS 
PCE D The amount of personal consumption 
expenditures 
Personal consumption expenditures consist of the actual and imputed expenditures 
of households. In other words, it is essentially a measure of goods and services 
consumed by individuals. 
PCE 
CL D The total amount of consumer loans at all 
commercial banks 
The H.8 release provides an estimated weekly aggregate balance sheet for all 
commercial banks in the United States. The release is primarily based on data that are 
reported weekly by a sample of approximately 875 domestically chartered banks and 
foreign-related institutions. 
CL 
NBER I52 The dates of U.S. business cycle expansions and 
contractions 
The NBER defines a recession as a significant decline in economic activity spread 
across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, 
real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. Within 
the time frame of this study, the NBER determined a recession took place from 
December 2007 through May 2009. 
NBER 
UNEMP I The national unemployment rate (from the 
current population survey) 
A monthly household survey that provides comprehensive information on the 
employment and unemployment of the population classified by age, sex, race, and 
other characteristics. 
UNEMP 
IP I The Industrial Production Index The Industrial Production Index is an economic indicator that measures real output 
for all facilities located in the United States manufacturing, mining, and electric, and 
gas utilities (excluding those in U.S. territories). The index highlights structural 
developments in the economy. 
IP 
                                                          
52 I denotes that the data item serves as an independent variable in its respective model. 
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Table 4:  Starting and Ending Dates of each of the Fed’s Bond Buying Programs 
Program Start Date End Date 
Quantitative Easing 1 November 25th, 200853 March 31st, 2010 
Quantitative Easing 2 November 30th, 2010 June 30th, 2011 
Operation Twist September 21st, 2011 December 31st, 2012 
Quantitative Easing 3 September 13th, 2012 October 29th, 201454 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 My data includes monthly totals, despite some programs starting in the middle of months. 
54 I define the end of Quantitative Easing 3 as the day in which the Fed announced its final taper. 
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Table 5:  The Yield Curve Model: Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
US2 US5 US10 US30 SLOPE TED 
Intercept 2.288* 2.856* 3.603* 4.271* 1.315* .745* 
 
(12.00) (18.68) (32.96) (57.84) (12.84) (9.10) 
QE1 -1.317* -0.525 -0.128 -.008 1.189* -.214 
 
(-3.20) (-1.59) (-.54) (-.05) (5.38) (-1.21) 
QE2 -1.683* -0.945* -0.337 0.144 1.346* -.557* 
 
(-3.43) (-2.40) (-1.20) (.76) (5.10) (-2.64) 
TWIST -2.017* -2.053* -1.746* -1.312* 0.271 -.380* 
 
(-5.46) (-6.92) (-8.24) (-9.17) (1.37) (-2.39) 
QE3 -1.877* -1.264* -0.969* -0.756* .907* -.549* 
 
(-4.87) (-4.08) (-4.38) (-5.06) (4.38) (-3.31) 
SIZEQE1 
-.000 -.003 -.004 -.004* -.004 .002 
 
(-.07) (-.80) (-1.43) (-2.14) (-1.40) (1.20) 
SIZEQE2 
.000 -.001 -.001 -.000 -.002 -.000 
 
(.02) (-.08) (-.12) (-.03) (-.16) (-.03) 
SIZETWIST 
-.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(-.00) (.04) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.02) 
SIZEQE3 
.000 .001 .002 .003 0.002 -.000 
 
(.01) (.09) (.27) (.51) (.27) (-.00) 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R2 
0.358 0.390 0.476 0.560 0.392 0.181 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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Table 6:  The Inflation Model: Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
INFL MCPI PPI USD 
Intercept -5.441 239.437 -136.208* 120.280* 
 
(-1.78) (1.86) (-3.50) (7.50) 
QE1 -.380 -23.259* -.412 -.812 
 
(-1.50) (-2.18) (-.13) (-.61) 
QE2 .084 15.593 4.680 -3.266* 
 
(.40) (1.46) (1.76) (-2.98) 
TWIST -.159 9.891 4.026 -.668 
 
(-1.00) (1.46) (1.97) (-.79) 
QE3 -.633* -3.964 3.045 3.178* 
 
(-2.94) (-.44) (1.11) (2.80) 
SIZEQE1 -.000 .116 -.022 .042* 
 
(-.43) (1.47) (-.91) (4.24) 
SIZEQE2 -.002 .230 .021 -.013 
 
(-.30) (.69) (.21) (-.32) 
SIZETWIST -.000 .172 -.011 .006 
 
(-.05) (1.00) (-.20) (.28) 
SIZEQE3 .000 -.077 -.008 -.002 
 
(.04) (-.29) (-.10) (-.08) 
UNEMP .089 -14.299* 7.086* -1.114* 
 
(1.63) (-6.21) (10.20) (-3.89) 
IP .0518 -.228 3.264* -.526* 
 
(1.78) (-.19) (8.83) (-3.45) 
CS .024* -.552* -.535* .184* 
 
(3.89) (-2.11) (-6.77) (5.65) 
N 97 97 97 97 
R2 0.489 0.662 0.849 0.609 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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Table 7:  The Money Supply Model: Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 
MB M2 
Intercept -22004.000* -27419.000* 
 
(-10.92) (-9.15) 
QE1 586.295* 850.371* 
 
(3.51) (3.42) 
QE2 1.483 -255.839 
 
(.01) (1.25) 
TWIST 153.262 330.670* 
 
(1.45) (2.10) 
QE3 1143.504* 1102.347* 
 
(8.02) (5.20) 
SIZEQE1 3.24* 5.573* 
 
(2.63) (3.04) 
SIZEQE2 -1.700 .787 
 
(-.32) (-.10) 
SIZETWIST -.337 .387 
 
(-.13) (.10) 
SIZEQE3 -2.438 -3.235 
 
(-.58) (-.52) 
UNEMP 621.680* 845.077* 
 
(17.26) (15.77) 
IP 193.944* 308.897 
 
(10.12) (10.84) 
CS 9.082* 2.871 
 
(2.22) (.47) 
N 97 97 
R2 0.912 0.901 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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Table 8: The Economic Activity Model: Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
 
SP500 CP CFSI PS PCE CL 
Intercept -47.06 -.022 9.521* .548 -10354.000* -1858.210* 
 
(-1.59) (-.09) (2.46) (.09) (-6.88) (-5.46) 
QE1 1.908 .005 .348 .493 346.009* -152.058* 
 
(.78) (.28) (1.08) (1.02) (2.77) (-5.38) 
QE2 .968 .024 -.328 .507 2.466 -21.352 
 
(.48) (1.42) (-1.24) (1.27) (.02) (-.92) 
TWIST .035 .014 1.025* 1.606* 150.780 4.640 
 
(.02) (1.04) (5.04) (5.25) (1.91) (.26) 
QE3 -.404 .009 -.840* .336 531.087* 114.954* 
 
(-.19) (.50) (-3.07) (.81) (4.99) (4.77) 
SIZEQE1 
.034 -.000 .003 .003 1.925* .729* 
 
(1.86) (-1.67) (1.25) (.74) (2.09) (3.50) 
SIZEQE2 
-.309 .000 .003 -.001 .753 .081 
 
(-.40) (.19) (.33) (-.09) (.19) (.09) 
SIZETWIST 
.043 .000 -.002 .010 -.058 .034 
 
(1.10) (1.01) (-.50) (1.28) (-.03) (.08) 
SIZEQE3 
.014 -.000 -.008 -.003 -1.298 -.388 
 
(.24) (-.08) (-.97) (-.29) (-.42) (-.55) 
UNEMP 1.106* -.002 -.222* .413* 426.083* 105.937* 
 
(2.09) (-.43) (-3.20) (3.96) (15.84) (17.40) 
IP .270 .000 -.009 .036 186.048* 21.696* 
 
(.96) (.02) (-.25) (.65) (13.00) (6.70) 
CS .172* .000 -.089* (-.034)* -3.417 -.190 
 
(2.87) (.58) (-11.26) (-2.57) (-1.12) (-.27) 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R2 0.175 0.120 0.779 0.662 0.921 0.910 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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Table 9:  CFSI’s Defined Stress Thresholds 
 CFSI Grade at Threshold CFSI Range Probability 
Grade 1 (below-normal stress) Less than or equal to -0.50 1.9% 
Grade 2 (normal stress) Between -0.50 and 0.59 8.7% 
Grade 3 (moderate stress) Between 0.59 and 1.68 26.3% 
Grade 4 (significant stress) Greater than 1.68 53.3% 
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B. Figures 
Figure 1:  The Percentage Change of Total Consumer Credit 
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Figure 2:  The Percentage Change in the Unemployment Rate and CPI Since 2004 
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Figure 3:  Discount Rates Since 2003 
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Figure 4:  Target vs. Effective Federal Funds Rate Since 2003 
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Figure 5:  The Yield Curve Shortly After the GFC 
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Figure 6:  The Yield Curve Shortly After the Fed’s Announcement to Pursue QE1 
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Figure 7: The Producer Price Index (October 2007 – February 2015) 
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X. Appendices  
A. Summary of Credit Easing Policy Tools 
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B. Reserve Requirements vs. Balances Maintained 
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C. Yield Curve Model: Correlation Matrix 
 
US2 US5 US10 US30 Slope TEDRATE QE1 QE2 TWIST QE3 SIZEQE1 SIZEQE2 SIZETWIST SIZEQE3 NBER
US2 1 0.95549 0.86472 0.72069 -0.81634 0.37954 -0.11165 -0.14413 -0.31545 -0.25194 -0.06435 -0.03542 -0.06403 -0.04054 0.1469
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.2763 0.159 0.0016 0.0128 0.5312 0.7305 0.5332 0.6934 0.1511
US5 1 0.96856 0.86476 -0.61635 0.36659 0.02134 -0.05916 -0.49143 -0.18545 -0.04514 -0.02121 -0.09609 -0.02283 0.17087
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 0.8356 0.5649 <.0001 0.069 0.6607 0.8366 0.3491 0.8243 0.0942
US10 1 0.95538 -0.41582 0.35394 0.10319 0.05194 -0.58944 -0.19959 -0.03879 0.00443 -0.11431 -0.01202 0.19347
<.0001 <.0001 0.0004 0.3145 0.6134 <.0001 0.05 0.706 0.9657 0.2649 0.907 0.0576
US30 1 -0.20633 0.22898 0.11005 0.21207 -0.62595 -0.23986 -0.06945 0.05213 -0.12309 -0.0041 0.13627
0.0426 0.0241 0.2833 0.037 <.0001 0.018 0.4991 0.6121 0.2297 0.9682 0.1832
Slope 1 -0.28024 0.32083 0.32071 -0.10664 0.22667 0.07191 0.06922 -0.0155 0.0596 -0.04352
0.0054 0.0014 0.0014 0.2985 0.0256 0.4839 0.5005 0.8802 0.562 0.6721
TEDRATE 1 0.08181 -0.18918 -0.13716 -0.25167 0.14126 -0.0514 -0.02552 -0.04157 0.736
0.4257 0.0635 0.1803 0.0129 0.1675 0.6171 0.804 0.686 <.0001
QE1 1 -0.13821 -0.20488 -0.18932 0.53184 -0.03528 -0.04148 -0.03105 0.26822
0.177 0.0441 0.0633 <.0001 0.7316 0.6866 0.7627 0.0079
QE2 1 -0.13325 -0.12313 -0.0735 0.25524 -0.02698 -0.0202 -0.14311
0.1932 0.2295 0.4743 0.0116 0.7931 0.8443 0.162
TWIST 1 -0.18253 -0.10896 -0.03401 0.20247 -0.02994 -0.21215
0.0735 0.2881 0.7409 0.0467 0.771 0.037
QE3 1 -0.10069 -0.03143 -0.03696 0.16402 -0.19604
0.3264 0.7599 0.7193 0.1084 0.0543
SIZEQE1 1 -0.01876 -0.02206 -0.01652 0.38622
0.8553 0.8302 0.8724 <.0001
SIZEQE2 1 -0.00689 -0.00516 -0.03653
0.9466 0.96 0.7224
SIZETWIST 1 -0.00606 -0.04295
0.953 0.6761
SIZEQE3 1 -0.03216
0.7545
NBER 1
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D. Yield Curve Model, Controlling for Business Cycles: Multiple Regression 
Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
US2 US5 US10 US30 SLOPE TED 
Intercept 2.288* 2.846* 3.582* 4.278* 1.294* .464* 
 
(10.63) (16.48) (29.03) (51.30) (11.19) (7.19) 
QE1 -1.317* -0.523 -0.125 -.009 1.192* -.177 
 
(-3.18) (-1.58) (-.53) (-.05) (5.37) (-1.42) 
QE2 -1.684* -0.935* -0.316 0.138 1.368* -.276 
 
(-3.34) (-2.31) (-1.09) (.70) (5.05) (-1.83) 
TWIST -2.018* -2.043* -1.725* -1.312* 0.293 -.099 
 
(-5.25) (-6.63) (-7.83) (-8.86) (1.42) (-.86) 
QE3 -1.877* -1.254* -0.948* -0.763* .929* -.268* 
 
(-4.69) (-3.91) (-4.13) (-4.92) (4.32) (-2.23) 
SIZEQE1 
-.000 -.003 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.002 
 
(-.06) (-.80) (-1.47) (-1.96) (-1.45) (-1.39) 
SIZEQE2 
.000 -.001 -.001 -.000 -.002 -.000 
 
(.02) (-.08) (-.12) (-.03) (-.16) (-.05) 
SIZETWIST 
-.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(-.00) (.04) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.03) 
SIZEQE3 
.000 .001 .002 .003 0.002 -.000 
 
(.01) (.09) (.27) (.50) (.27) (-.00) 
NBER -.001 .038 .080 .024 .082 1.073 
 
(-.00) (.13) (.37) (-.17) (.41) (9.56) 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R2 
0.358 0.390 0.477 0.56 0.393 0.601 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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E. Inflation Model: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
INFL PPI MCPI USD QE1 QE2 TWIST QE3 SIZEQE1 SIZEQE2 SIZETWIST SIZEQE3 UNEMP IP CS
INFL 1 0.2345 0.332 -0.42906 -0.56494 0.09855 0.07599 -0.00248 -0.40092 0.01375 0.0143 0.0016 -0.31094 0.4814 0.51796
0.0208 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001 0.3369 0.4594 0.9808 <.0001 0.8937 0.8895 0.9876 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001
PPI 1 0.0751 -0.53772 -0.51631 0.13873 0.36176 0.43319 -0.35066 0.0175 0.07216 0.07219 0.15714 0.46072 -0.04943
0.4648 <.0001 <.0001 0.1754 0.0003 <.0001 0.0004 0.8649 0.4824 0.4823 0.1243 <.0001 0.6307
MCPI 1 0.02183 -0.52061 -0.05645 0.00738 0.0597 -0.14159 0.01501 0.07039 -0.01766 -0.73198 0.59279 0.25862
0.8319 <.0001 0.5829 0.9428 0.5613 0.1665 0.884 0.4933 0.8637 <.0001 <.0001 0.0105
USD 1 0.27171 -0.34855 -0.29438 0.16013 0.3944 -0.08208 -0.04603 0.01636 -0.32135 -0.00502 0.32267
0.0071 0.0005 0.0034 0.1172 <.0001 0.4241 0.6543 0.8736 0.0013 0.961 0.0013
QE1 1 -0.13821 -0.20488 -0.18932 0.53184 -0.03528 -0.04148 -0.03105 0.43219 -0.75617 -0.3891
0.177 0.0441 0.0633 <.0001 0.7316 0.6866 0.7627 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
QE2 1 -0.13325 -0.12313 -0.0735 0.25524 -0.02698 -0.0202 0.29371 -0.17581 -0.06152
0.1932 0.2295 0.4743 0.0116 0.7931 0.8443 0.0035 0.085 0.5494
TWIST 1 -0.18253 -0.10896 -0.03401 0.20247 -0.02994 0.20075 0.05855 -0.05994
0.0735 0.2881 0.7409 0.0467 0.771 0.0486 0.5689 0.5598
QE3 1 -0.10069 -0.03143 -0.03696 0.16402 -0.21433 0.53311 0.28577
0.3264 0.7599 0.7193 0.1084 0.035 <.0001 0.0045
SIZEQE1 1 -0.01876 -0.02206 -0.01652 0.18928 -0.43895 -0.32156
0.8553 0.8302 0.8724 0.0633 <.0001 0.0013
SIZEQE2 1 -0.00689 -0.00516 0.08237 -0.05905 0.02711
0.9466 0.96 0.4225 0.5656 0.7921
SIZETWIST 1 -0.00606 0.03218 0.02312 -0.01406
0.953 0.7543 0.8222 0.8913
SIZEQE3 1 -0.02255 0.08158 0.04269
0.8265 0.427 0.678
UNEMP 1 -0.73834 -0.49006
<.0001 <.0001
IP 1 0.56649
<.0001
CS 1
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F. Inflation Model without Controlling for Business Cycles: Multiple 
Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
INFL MCPI PPI USD 
Intercept 2.009* 83.326* 186.286* 75.932* 
 
(25.55) (20.30) (121.7) (161.63) 
QE1 -.843* -57.327* -9.551* -.012 
 
(-4.97) (-6.48) (-2.89) (-.01) 
QE2 -.018 -20.524 10.991* -4.616* 
 
(-.09) (-1.94) (2.78) (-3.81) 
TWIST -.120 -14.424 15.717* -2.808* 
 
(-.79) (-1.81) (5.30) (-3.08) 
QE3 -.227 -8.754 19.107* 1.048 
 
(-1.43) (-1.05) (6.17) (1.10) 
SIZEQE1 
-.002 .193 
-.049 
.041* 
 
(-1.38) (1.85) (-1.26) (3.46) 
SIZEQE2 
-.001 .161 -.044 .004 
 
(-.14) (.35) (-.26) (.08) 
SIZETWIST 
-.000 .191 -.001 .004 
 
(-.01) (.82) (-.02) (.16) 
SIZEQE3 
.000 -.118 .002 -.005 
 
(.02) (-.32) (.02) (-.12) 
N 97 97 97 97 
R2 
0.351 0.345 0.554 0.359 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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G. Money Supply Model: Correlation Matrix 
 
MB M2 QE1 QE2 TWIST QE3 SIZEQE1 SIZEQE2 SIZETWIST SIZEQE3 UNEMP IP CS
MB 1 0.9767 -0.1668 0.03844 0.20767 0.68599 -0.11176 -0.00303 0.04063 0.10226 0.32651 0.29236 0.13286
<.0001 0.1025 0.7085 0.0412 <.0001 0.2758 0.9765 0.6927 0.3189 0.0011 0.0037 0.1945
M2 1 -0.2325 -0.03268 0.28314 0.65294 -0.12722 -0.01367 0.0652 0.09629 0.2572 0.36919 0.12692
0.0219 0.7506 0.005 <.0001 0.2143 0.8943 0.5258 0.3481 0.011 0.0002 0.2154
QE1 1 -0.13821 -0.20488 -0.18932 0.53184 -0.03528 -0.04148 -0.03105 0.43219 -0.75617 -0.3891
0.177 0.0441 0.0633 <.0001 0.7316 0.6866 0.7627 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
QE2 1 -0.13325 -0.12313 -0.0735 0.25524 -0.02698 -0.0202 0.29371 -0.17581 -0.06152
0.1932 0.2295 0.4743 0.0116 0.7931 0.8443 0.0035 0.085 0.5494
TWIST 1 -0.18253 -0.10896 -0.03401 0.20247 -0.02994 0.20075 0.05855 -0.05994
0.0735 0.2881 0.7409 0.0467 0.771 0.0486 0.5689 0.5598
QE3 1 -0.10069 -0.03143 -0.03696 0.16402 -0.21433 0.53311 0.28577
0.3264 0.7599 0.7193 0.1084 0.035 <.0001 0.0045
SIZEQE1 1 -0.01876 -0.02206 -0.01652 0.18928 -0.43895 -0.32156
0.8553 0.8302 0.8724 0.0633 <.0001 0.0013
SIZEQE2 1 -0.00689 -0.00516 0.08237 -0.05905 0.02711
0.9466 0.96 0.4225 0.5656 0.7921
SIZETWIST 1 -0.00606 0.03218 0.02312 -0.01406
0.953 0.7543 0.8222 0.8913
SIZEQE3 1 -0.02255 0.08158 0.04269
0.8265 0.427 0.678
UNEMP 1 -0.73834 -0.49006
<.0001 <.0001
IP 1 0.56649
<.0001
CS 1
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H. Money Supply Model without Controlling for Business Cycles: Multiple 
Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 
MB M2 
Intercept 1569.618* 8311.010* 
 
(15.75) (60.82) 
QE1 297.769 67.752 
 
(1.39) (.23) 
QE2 758.559* 597.763 
 
(2.95) (1.70) 
TWIST 1087.753* 1589.054* 
 
(5.63) (6.00) 
QE3 2302.678* 2884.754* 
 
(11.42) (10.43) 
SIZEQE1 
-1.055 -.219 
 
(-.42) (-.06) 
SIZEQE2 
-2.254 1.252 
 
(-.20) (-.08) 
SIZETWIST 
-.126 .937 
 
(-.02) (.12) 
SIZEQE3 
-1.413 -1.991 
 
(-.16) (-.16) 
N 97 97 
R2 
0.627 0.607 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
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I. Economic Activity Model: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
SP500 CP CL PS PCE CFSI QE1 QE2 TWIST QE3 SIZEQE1 SIZEQE2 SIZETWIST SIZEQE3 UNEMP IP CS
SP500 1 -0.19171 0.10888 0.01736 0.11138 -0.16277 0.07564 0.0575 0.05168 0.09069 0.13129 -0.01015 0.11592 0.04002 0.15532 -0.03341 0.1766
0.0599 0.2884 0.866 0.2774 0.1112 0.4615 0.5759 0.6151 0.377 0.1999 0.9214 0.2582 0.6971 0.1287 0.7453 0.0836
CP 1 -0.8751 -0.645 -0.7162 0.09831 -0.00249 -0.16517 -0.36977 -0.29393 0.06092 -0.04548 -0.073 -0.04927 -0.73179 0.13477 0.15873
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3381 0.9807 0.1059 0.0002 0.0035 0.5534 0.6582 0.4773 0.6318 <.0001 0.1881 0.1205
CL 1 0.47225 0.84994 -0.23025 -0.37482 0.19001 0.31135 0.44339 -0.17374 0.04916 0.06378 0.06574 0.45198 0.21124 -0.00355
<.0001 <.0001 0.0233 0.0002 0.0623 0.0019 <.0001 0.0888 0.6325 0.5348 0.5223 <.0001 0.0378 0.9724
PS 1 0.24816 0.32963 0.24371 0.14809 0.50153 -0.13786 0.16713 0.0258 0.17785 -0.03397 0.68573 -0.43413 -0.45916
0.0142 0.001 0.0161 0.1477 <.0001 0.1781 0.1018 0.802 0.0814 0.7412 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
PCE 1 -0.35609 -0.4156 -0.00495 0.27014 0.68276 -0.25114 -0.00907 0.06058 0.10447 0.08797 0.55005 0.20058
0.0003 <.0001 0.9617 0.0075 <.0001 0.0131 0.9297 0.5556 0.3085 0.3915 <.0001 0.0488
CFSI 1 0.31294 -0.15371 0.31838 -0.49528 0.32008 -0.05531 0.04308 -0.13088 0.20376 -0.42516 -0.73137
0.0018 0.1328 0.0015 <.0001 0.0014 0.5905 0.6752 0.2013 0.0453 <.0001 <.0001
QE1 1 -0.13821 -0.20488 -0.18932 0.53184 -0.03528 -0.04148 -0.03105 0.43219 -0.75617 -0.3891
0.177 0.0441 0.0633 <.0001 0.7316 0.6866 0.7627 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
QE2 1 -0.13325 -0.12313 -0.0735 0.25524 -0.02698 -0.0202 0.29371 -0.17581 -0.06152
0.1932 0.2295 0.4743 0.0116 0.7931 0.8443 0.0035 0.085 0.5494
TWIST 1 -0.18253 -0.10896 -0.03401 0.20247 -0.02994 0.20075 0.05855 -0.05994
0.0735 0.2881 0.7409 0.0467 0.771 0.0486 0.5689 0.5598
QE3 1 -0.10069 -0.03143 -0.03696 0.16402 -0.21433 0.53311 0.28577
0.3264 0.7599 0.7193 0.1084 0.035 <.0001 0.0045
SIZEQE1 1 -0.01876 -0.02206 -0.01652 0.18928 -0.43895 -0.32156
0.8553 0.8302 0.8724 0.0633 <.0001 0.0013
SIZEQE2 1 -0.00689 -0.00516 0.08237 -0.05905 0.02711
0.9466 0.96 0.4225 0.5656 0.7921
SIZETWIST 1 -0.00606 0.03218 0.02312 -0.01406
0.953 0.7543 0.8222 0.8913
SIZEQE3 1 -0.02255 0.08158 0.04269
0.8265 0.427 0.678
UNEMP 1 -0.73834 -0.49006
<.0001 <.0001
IP 1 0.56649
<.0001
CS 1
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J. Economic Activity Model without Controlling for Business Cycles: 
Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
SP500 CP CFSI PS PCE CL 
Intercept 
-.481 -.007 .424* 4.374* 10242* 920.051* 
 
(-.67) (-1.36) (2.99) (26.23) (147.67) (48.57) 
QE1 
.953 -.002 .498 1.5348* -321.414* -71.498 
 
(.61) (-.19) (1.63) (4.27) (-2.15) (-1.76) 
QE2 
2.011 .018 -.523 1.606* 309.087 169.038* 
 
(1.08) (1.18) (-1.43) (3.73) (1.73) (3.47) 
TWIST 
1.274 .009 .905* 2.427* 772.624* 179.809* 
 
(.91) (.83) (3.29) (7.51) (5.75) (4.91) 
QE3 
1.975 .010 -1.321* .420 1575.086* 241.354* 
 
(1.35) (.89) (-4.60) (1.24) (11.22) (6.32) 
SIZEQE1 
.019 
-.000 .008* .002 -1.035 .187 
 
(1.04) (-1.80) (2.26) (.57) (-.59) (.39) 
SIZEQE2 
-.020 
.000 -.003 -.003 -1.030 .018 
 
(-.25) (.22) (-.21) (-.16) (-.13) (.01) 
SIZETWIST 
.043 
.000 .-.002 .010 .39 .011 
 
(1.04) (1.03) (-.27) (1.01) (.10) (.01) 
SIZEQE3 
.016 
-.000 -.008 -.002 -.778 -.154 
 
(.25) (-.09) (-.63) (-.15) (-.13) (-.09) 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R2 
0.063 0.108 0.434 0.473 0.679 0.475 
 
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
